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“A valid electoral exercise”? 
Uganda’s 1980 elections and the observers’ dilemma 
 
The day after the December 1980 Uganda general elections, the Commonwealth Observer Group 
that had watched the polls released an interim statement. They described the process as a ‘valid 
electoral exercise, which should broadly reflect the freely expressed choice of the people of 
Uganda’.1 The statement carefully avoided the phrase ‘free and fair’, and noted ‘imperfections and 
deficiencies’ that had caused ‘deep unease’. But the Group did not condemn the elections.  
Within hours of this statement, two of the four parties that had competed in the elections 
denounced them as rigged. One party leader, Yoweri Museveni, soon left Kampala to launch a 
guerrilla war against Milton Obote, whose Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) had been declared the 
winner. Meanwhile, the international press reported dissenting views from within the Observer 
Group: ‘I’ve picked over this carcass all I want to’, one member allegedly told a New York Times 
reporter, ‘I’m going to have a go at trying to forget it’.2 The British government, which had provided 
substantial financial support for the elections and for the observer group, struggled for words to 
accept the victory of Obote without entirely endorsing the electoral process.3 The message finally 
sent to the new leader maladroitly offered ‘best wishes on the occasion of your installation as 
president’.4  
While Obote’s supporters have continued to insist that the polls were fair, it has subsequently been 
repeatedly argued that – in the words of the historian Samwiri Karugire – ‘the 1980 elections were 
rigged to give power to the UPC’.5 The rigging of the elections – in which the UK, Tanzania and others 
                                                          
1
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have been accused of complicity – is widely understood to be a direct cause of five years of civil war, 
at the end of which, Museveni returned triumphant to Kampala in January 1986, at the head of the 
National Resistance Army.6  
The events in Uganda in 1980 sit uncertainly in the history of election observation. They might be 
seen as seminal – the first example of a formal international election observation in a sovereign 
state in Africa, and the forerunner of multiple subsequent Commonwealth missions.7 But in later 
years some were anxious to forget them. There is no mention of the 1980 mission in the 
hagiographical collection published to honour Shridath Ramphal, the secretary-general of the 
Commonwealth who had played a key role in creating the Observer Group; nor in the 
autobiographical account by his then-deputy, Emeka Anyaoku – though the latter contains a whole 
chapter celebrating the work of later observation missions.8 A summary history of Commonwealth 
missions has suggested that the 1980 observer group came to be seen as something of an 
embarrassment, characterised by ‘inadequate preparation and political naivete’.9  
This article argues that the 1980 observation mission was neither an entirely new departure, nor an 
aberration. External observation had, after all, been an occasional feature of the ‘founding’ elections 
that were a central part of the transition from colonial rule to independence across Africa, from 
Sudan’s 1953 ‘self-government’ election to the polls in Zimbabwe in 1979.10 While formal 
‘observation missions’ were not a feature of early post-independence elections, the minatory 
announcement from the Chairman of Sudan’s Electoral Commission in 1958 that ‘the eyes of the 
world are focussed upon us’ was repeated in various ways across Anglophone Africa as a recurrent 
reminder of the power of the international gaze.11 Diplomats, journalists, and visiting 
parliamentarians all served as an occasional, even sometimes invited, audience at electoral 
performances. At the same time, the story of the Commonwealth Observer Group to Uganda reveals 
a dilemma of election monitoring that was to recur repeatedly during and after the ‘second 
liberation’ of the 1990s in Africa: whether to risk undermining order and state legitimacy by 
denouncing elections for evident failings, or to prioritize stability and withhold criticism? This 
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‘observers’ dilemma’ – revealed with particular clarity in the case of Uganda in 1980 by the 
availability of UK government records – is a key lesson of this story. We argue that this dilemma may 
lead observers to conclusions that are shaped less by the thorny question of how ‘clean’ elections 
are – for, after all, the ‘menu of manipulation’ may include many dishes which are entirely legal – 
and rather more by assumptions about political stability, which are reinforced by performances of 
orderly popular participation and administrative ability.12 At the same time, the Ugandan case shows 
that the observers’ dilemma is not simply the product of an extraverted politics driven by an 
international agenda: it also reflects local ideas about the relationship between elections and order. 
 
What are elections for? 
Understanding the observers’ dilemma involves addressing a question that was implicitly raised by 
the report of the Observer Group itself: why were multi-party elections held in such difficult 
conditions? Only eighteen months earlier, Idi Amin had been driven from power by Tanzanian 
soldiers and Ugandan rebels, and the country was still wracked by insecurity and beset by shortages. 
Moreover – though the report did not acknowledge this – it was widely believed that Obote and the 
soldiers who supported him would not accept any result other than a UPC victory. That specific 
question about Uganda in 1980 may in turn be generalized: why are elections often held in 
apparently unpropitious circumstances, from Afghanistan to Iraq, and what is the intended purpose 
of international monitoring?  
For some, the answers to these questions are self-evident. The belief that ‘universal access to the 
liberal world was possible’, parodied by Peter Sloterdijk’s suggestion of an air-droppable ‘pneumatic 
parliament’, has been integral to projects of ‘state-building’ in the post-Cold War world.13 
Democratization has proved to be ideally inseparable from the pursuit of political stability for 
Western leaders.14 Elections, then, are part of ‘democracy promotion’, a process driven by an 
alliance between external democracy promoters (the US, the European Union, and others) and 
internal pro-democracy forces in political parties and civil society.15 This answer itself shapes 
responses to the other questions: elections are monitored to try to ensure that they do promote 
democratization, and monitoring itself is judged in those terms.16 While the process has evidently 
been far from smooth – as multiple critical studies show – elections and monitoring can still be 
understood as primarily part of an incremental process of democratization. For example, Susan Hyde 
has argued that elections and monitoring create a dilemma for authoritarian rulers, who are forced 
to open up political space by their desire for international legitimacy.17  
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State-building may be a new term, but the vision is a recurring one: the processes of decolonization 
in Africa had been shaped partly by the belief that ‘institutional transfer’ (as David Apter called it at 
the time) could transform political culture, and that elections by secret ballot would themselves 
produce liberal democracy.18 Yet the process of decolonization had already called into doubt that 
linkage between genuine political choice and state-building. In late-colonial elections the choosing of 
leaders or policies was already secondary to the performative assertion of stateness, which ‘gave 
proof that the colony was ready for the transition to the nation’.19 Elections became a norm, 
expected by voters and civil servants as much as by a wider world. But the widespread move to 
single-party electoral politics across most of the continent after independence made clear that this 
was rooted less in the idea of choice, and more in what John and Jean Comaroff have called the 
‘fetishization’ of the ballot, which imbues voting itself with an ordering agency that underwrites the 
notion of lawful order and authorises state power.20 Against this backdrop, Uganda’s 1980 elections 
drew on a regional and continental experience in which the ballot was much more about state-
building than about substantive political choice: the polls were seen, as the Observer Group put it, as 
‘an essential first step towards national rehabilitation’.  
In identifying the importance of that previous experience, we seek to nuance the emphasis on 
external democracy-promoters evident in some of the literature cited above. We also challenge the 
more critical literature on elections and election observation in Africa that has seen both as evidence 
of the profound extraversion of African politics. We argue that the holding of elections in Uganda, 
and the presence of the Commonwealth Observation Group, were the consequence of the 
concatenation of particular and contingent circumstances with a widely-circulating but diffuse set of 
ideas which foregrounded elections as key tools for the creation and maintenance of a law-based 
stability – or, as Kimberley Coles has put it, as a sort of scientific laboratory for the production of 
‘facts, knowledge and order’.21 While Jean-Francois Bayart has denounced ‘the discourse of 
democracy’ as ‘a form of pidgin language that various native princes use in their communication 
with Western sovereigns’, elections in Uganda were produced by very local imaginings of what the 
state should be, as well as by the ambitions of those who sought to be ‘national’ politicians, and the 
expectations of regional and international governments.22  In 1980, the crucial impetus for elections, 
and for international observation, came from within Uganda. A wide range of actors there – albeit in 
different ways – saw elections as a means to re-establish state authority, which had been grossly 
compromised under Amin; reassert a former social order; and tame security forces which had 
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become predatory and unpredictable. The evidence from Uganda suggests that the fetishization of 
the ballot was not simply, as the Comaroffs argue, ‘thrust upon the world at large’ whether by late-
colonial governments or a subsequent international gaze.23 It acquired significant local force, and 
became entangled with the instrumental calculations of individuals and groups: driving decisions to 
hold elections, to hold them on a multi-party basis, and to invite international observers, and 
ultimately leaving those observers feeling that they had no option other than the endorsement of a 
flawed election. The Ugandan case demonstrates that an optimistic faith in the power of elections 
was co-produced, at multiple levels. But it also reminds us of the ambiguities of that faith, and the 
tension between the role of elections as, on the one hand, demonstrative exercises of stateness and, 
on the other hand, opportunities for genuine political choice.  
    
The Ugandan political landscape 
Uganda, like many African countries, had enjoyed a brief and intense moment of multi-party politics 
leading up to independence, with parliamentary elections in 1958 (on a limited franchise), and again 
in 1961 and 1962. The 1962 elections, just prior to independence, were won by Obote and his UPC 
party. That victory was the result of a pact between Obote and the supporters of the kabaka, or 
king, of Buganda, who sought a federal route to independence which would maintain – and even 
enhance – the autonomy that Buganda had enjoyed within the British protectorate of Uganda.24 The 
kabaka’s supporters feared that a victory by Obote’s main rival, the Democratic Party (DP), would 
fatally undermine the monarchy.25  Obote’s victory – in an election marked by high turnout and 
multiple allegations of malpractice – led to an independence settlement which offered autonomy to 
Buganda and made the kabaka the nominal head of state of Uganda as a whole. 26   
Within five years, Obote turned on the kabaka and his supporters – as many had anticipated. In 
1966 the kabaka fled into exile, and in 1967 Obote himself became president under a new 
constitution that abolished Buganda (and other, smaller kingdoms recognized by the independence 
constitution). In 1969, all other political parties were banned, on the grounds (as in other one-party 
states) that they encouraged tribalism and sectarianism. The presidents of neighbouring Kenya and 
Tanzania had succeeded in holding national single-party elections, which – whatever the actual 
dynamics of the electoral process – were offered as evidence of support for the regime, and of 
administrative competence.27 Obote insisted that ‘the Party must aim at establishing a democracy 
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which is controlled and managed by the Common Man’ and that ‘[t]he people must have a voice in 
the election of the President’; but he wrestled with the challenge of emulating his neighbours’ 
performance.28 Aware that the banning of opposition parties had led to the emergence in some 
areas of a faction within UPC that was widely interpreted as a proxy for DP, Obote feared that even 
single-party elections could lead to embarrassing defeats for his allies, especially in Buganda, where 
his suppression of the kingdom had made him profoundly unpopular.29 Plans for a highly complex – 
and quite possibly unworkable – election with ‘paired’ constituencies around the country were 
interrupted by Amin’s coup in January 1971.30  
Amin’s regime has become a by-word for misrule and brutality. Most significantly, it was felt by 
many Ugandans – especially, but not exclusively, by the educated – as a breakdown of order, a 
humiliating time of institutional collapse driven by ‘brutality and irrationality’.31 In the end, it was 
Amin’s inept attempt to seize a slice of Tanzanian territory that led to his downfall. In March 1979, 
an invited group of Ugandan politicians gathered in the Tanzanian town of Moshi to discuss what 
would happen when Amin was driven from power – a moment which was more imminent than the 
delegates realized, as the Tanzanian army and a motley Ugandan rebel force were already heading 
towards Kampala.32  
Ugandans looked forward to the end of this national trauma, but they did so with some trepidation. 
The Moshi meeting had been organized by the Tanzanian government, which was anxious to 
legitimize what was in effect an invasion of Uganda, which breached the charter of the Organization 
of African Unity.33 The notable absentee from Moshi was Obote, who had spent most of his years of 
exile in Tanzania. Many Ugandans – and others – suspected that Nyerere intended simply to reinstall 
Obote as president.34 This was, presumably, why he was not present; for Nyerere, the conference 
had to be seen to be independent from Obote’s influence. Though Paulo Muwanga, a close ally of 
Obote, was a very visible presence, so too were the leaders of the DP, and other prominent 
politicians and intellectuals – many of whom were bitterly critical of the former president.35 
The Moshi conference agreed on the formation of a 30-member National Consultative Council (NCC), 
which was largely drawn from those who were present; and it agreed that this Council would rule 
Uganda on a transitional basis, with a smaller Executive Committee as a key decision-making body.36 
                                                          
28
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It also agreed – with some difficulty – on the appointment of a chair to the NCC, who would also be 
the interim president of Uganda pending the holding of elections: Yusuf Lule, a former minister and 
university administrator from Buganda.37 Two weeks later, Lule was sworn in.  
Lule lasted less than three months as president, before he was effectively ousted by the NCC.38 He 
was succeeded by another man from Buganda, Godfrey Binaisa, who remained rather uncertainly in 
office until May 1980 before he was also removed, effectively by what was now called the Uganda 
National Liberation Army – the rebel movement-turned-army – in what Binaisa’s supporters 
denounced as a ‘Tanzania-supported coup’.39 By the time Binaisa was ousted, the NCC had almost 
ceased to function; instead, power lay in the hands of a Military Commission, chaired by Muwanga, 
who had in effect become head of state and had also largely succeeded in sidelining his nominal 
deputy at the Military Commission, Yoweri Museveni. The ‘consensus’ reached at Moshi had been 
ephemeral. Obote, meanwhile, remained in the Tanzanian capital, Dar es Salaam, biding his time. 
The confusion and uncertainty over who was the legitimate head of state was reflected throughout 
the country. The administration had partly collapsed by the end of Amin’s rule, due to a combination 
of large-scale ‘restructuring’, fiscal crisis, and endemic violence. Lule and Binaisa each introduced 
slightly revised structures, restoring (more or less) the previous district administrative structure; 
however, neither had any funds to pay for these. The police force had almost vanished; security was 
in the hands either of Tanzanian soldiers and police (who were resented and increasingly subject to 
attack) or of the undisciplined UNLA. Amin’s fall had seen a major wave of looting across the 
country, and violent crime had increased.40 For ordinary Ugandans, the economic and security 
situation seemed dire. Meanwhile the Tanzanian government, desperately short of funds, was 
anxious to withdraw its soldiers. 
Voting for order 
For many, elections seemed to offer a way out of this downward spiral – but there were very 
different ideas of what that way out might be, and what those elections might look like. The Moshi 
conference had agreed that elections should be held after two years; subsequently the Executive 
Council – dominated by men who considered themselves radical, some of them former associates of 
Obote who had turned against him – announced that these elections should be organized on a non-
party basis, with candidates standing as individuals under the ‘umbrella’ of the Uganda National 
Liberation Front. The NCC endorsed this.41 It was a decision that reflected the influence of a 
generation of nationalist politicians from the 1950s and 1960s, whose formation had been much 
more complex than a simple colonial tutelage: they had learned from colonial ‘statism’ (as Naomi 
Chazan has called it) but they had also been drawn into wider debates across Africa and Asia, 
influenced by Nehru and others, which had exalted unity and consensus in the name of the nation 
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and which suspected parties as sectarian and divisive.42 For them, elections should be expressions of 
unity and of national discipline: a ‘government of the people’, as one NCC statement put it.43 More 
immediately, of course, no-party elections were a device to contain Obote, whose opponents feared 
that the UPC might still be an effective mobilising force if allowed to operate.  
Binaisa too had repeatedly insisted that no-party elections would be held, ‘to enable the country to 
settle down under the leadership of a popularly-elected government’.44  He had – before his ousting 
– promised again that these would take place by June 1981; on 4 May, just before Binaisa lost 
power, a radio announcement from the government repeated that ‘no political party activity will be 
permitted’ during the elections.45 In the wake of Binaisa’s removal, Muwanga’s regime promised ‘the 
restoration of democracy’. Amid rumours that the head of the army – an ally of Obote – had ordered 
a million t-shirts with Obote’s face on them, Obote himself announced that he planned to return to 
Uganda to campaign in the elections on a party basis.46 At the end of May, he landed by air in the 
western town of Bushenyi to address a rally.47 On the same day, the main English-language (and 
government-owned) newspaper in Tanzania editorialised that the role of government in Uganda was 
now solely ‘to prepare the country for presidential and parliamentary elections not later than 30 
September 1980. All parties shall be free to participate in the elections’.48  
Since Tanzania had been a one-party state for more than a decade, there was some irony to this; 
some in Uganda saw Nyerere’s new interest in multi-partyism as driven solely by his desire to see his 
old regional ally Obote back in power. A few weeks later, the Uganda government-owned Uganda 
Times, which was entirely partisan to the UPC, announced that elections would indeed be held on 
party lines, and only four parties would be permitted.49 The DP and UPC were joined by a Buganda-
monarchist Conservative Party and by the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), led by Museveni in a 
‘managed pluralism’ which echoed – presumably knowingly – the system adopted for Senegal’s 1978 
elections.50 
There can be no doubt that the decision to hold multi-party elections was pushed through by 
Obote’s allies. Thus, campaigning for UPC, Muwanga described himself as ‘one who struggled to see 
that the people of Uganda went back to democratic party politics’.51 Obote would have preferred a 
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direct presidential vote, but was willing to accept a parliamentary, first past-the-post system with 
the leader of the winning party becoming president.52 Many years later, a close confidante of Obote 
emphasised the latter’s awareness that the international expectation of elections made military rule 
unsustainable: ‘[h]ow would we show ourselves to the world, when the whole world is talking of 
democracy? ….. It would cut our ties to the world.’53 Over the next few months, Obote repeatedly 
staked his claims to future legitimacy on victory in the ballot: ‘Our confidence rests on the support of 
the people which exists. We are a party of the People, a Party of the Peasant, a Party of the 
Worker’.54 Speaking to the UPC conference, he said ‘I charge you with organising the multitudes 
everywhere so that in the polls we teach opponents a lesson they will never forget’; and shortly 
before elections he reportedly told a press conference that ‘election is a matter of honor to disprove 
foreign mass media which have been propagating that Dr Obote, and his party the UPC, are 
extremely unpopular in Uganda.’55 The UPC took some pleasure in observing that ‘Uganda will be the 
only country in this part of Africa where the elections would not be restricted to one party’.56  
But it was not only the UPC which sought elections: the holding of multi-party elections was also 
possible because other politicians were equally desperate to have elections, and promised the public 
that these would be held.57 All saw these as a means to restore some sort of authority and order, 
and they preferred multi-party elections to no elections at all. The DP accepted this system partly 
because they believed they could win, and Museveni too seems to have been (delusionally) 
persuaded that his electoral prospects were good; in the face of considerable contrary evidence, 
members of both parties insisted that Obote did not really want elections, because he had no 
popular support.58 But more than this, both DP and UPM saw elections as an affirmation of the very 
idea of a Ugandan state that was in danger of unravelling: ‘UPM believes that a general election is a 
condition precedent to Uganda returning to normality’.59 Even for those who feared losing, elections 
offered a validation of a set of ideas about political order and law.60 Echoing the injunctions to 
electoral participation which had filled newspapers in the independence period, the Uganda Times 
editorialised that ‘the majority of our people . . . are banking on the election as a prerequisite for 
better and prosperous Uganda’ [sic] and that ‘anybody who is bent on disrupting the elections is an 
enemy of the people’.61 Even the forms and practice of electoral management drew directly on late-
colonial precedent, in everything from the symbol used for the Election Commission to the central 
role given to district commissioners. And while the DP and UPM repeatedly flirted with the idea of 
an alliance, or of an agreement to boycott the elections, they could not agree on either. This was 
partly because of their mutual distrust, but also because leading figures in both parties wanted the 
elections to happen. The alleged popular desire for elections became in itself a legitimising tool: ‘the 
people want elections’, as the Uganda Times insisted.62 
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The other parties had ample reason to consider a boycott. In the months following May, Muwanga 
and the Military Commission became ever more openly partisan in their behaviour, with the result 
that government-owned media were entirely biased in favour of Obote. He, and UPC candidates 
generally, were given security and transport facilities by the military, while DP and UPM politicians 
suffered harassment, and occasional lethal violence.63 Museveni himself was detained at a road 
block for several hours until he was rescued by his own armed followers.64 Yet, despite the violence, 
there was widespread enthusiasm for the election. With the partial exception of the UPC, all parties 
were short of funds, but found that local supporters were willing to make good this deficiency, as 
the then-leader of the DP later explained: 
people would come with their vehicles, and those who had fuel would come with their 
vehicles with fuel. And we would use those vehicles. They would organize big rallies, at their 
expense. You are having a meeting in Masaka, you don’t go and pay for that rally. People in 
Masaka organize themselves, financially, to have that rally.65 
Across the country, the locally influential men (and a few women) who had been the backbone of 
political activism in the 1960s threw themselves into the election, raising funds through local 
auctions in which they ostentatiously bought petty items for large sums of money.66 Partly of course, 
this might be seen as investment in the potential spoils of office, though a risky one: after the UPC 
nominations ‘[o]ne of the unsuccessful candidates is understood to have wept openly after spending 
3m /-’, reported the Uganda Times.67 But it was also a reaffirmation of status by people who had 
been sidelined by Amin’s unpredictable rule, in which education and social position were no 
guarantee of security. Uganda’s political parties had never really been national structures: each was 
a ‘loose federation of notables’, or a collection of ‘local political systems, each with its own political 
elite’.68 With the end of Amin’s rule, these local elites – the big men of small towns across the 
country – leaped at the chance to reassert their status, and renew their rivalries, through electoral 
contest.  
Their enthusiasm was shared more widely.  The distinctive power of elections to make order is, as 
Coles has argued, rooted in the way that they bring together multiple techniques, drawing very large 
numbers of people into involvement with a ‘network of material and knowledge practices’ – as 
supervisors, local electoral workers, or as voters.69 Tens of thousands of civil servants, local notables, 
and educated women and men hired temporarily for the process were drawn into processes of 
mapping and listing which provided paper proof that Uganda was a state, and that the population 
were citizens: they identified possible polling stations, carefully wrote down the names of possible 
staff in exercise books, submitted requests for election materials, sat waiting at desks with pens and 
stamps poised.70  When the registration of voters began – very belatedly and hurriedly – it was 
accompanied by adverts that stressed citizenship: ‘Prove you are a real Ugandan by participating in 
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the forthcoming elections’.71 How persuasive this was in itself is hard to say, but there were very 
high levels of registration in much of the country. The high figures may have been driven by some 
local malpractice (whether all would-be voters really registered individually, as the law required, is 
not clear); but they suggest a popular enthusiasm which went beyond local elites and civil servants: 
and diplomats believed that the ‘Ugandan people are anxious to hold elections’.72  
Late-colonial elections had established the idea that elections would ‘legitimate a new nation’ and 
make citizens, and were therefore critical to statebuilding.73  The official insistence that the election 
was ‘vital to the nation’ drew on that idea, and was perhaps not so far from the popular perception: 
Ugandans more widely could see elections as a way to reassert a model of civic order, a way to tame 
the soldiers who had become the unpredictable and violent face of a semi-collapsed state.74 
Uneasily aware of Obote’s jibe that those who opposed elections were not ‘nationally conscious’ and 
reassured by the way that electoral processes seemed to reconstitute a social order that might 
strengthen the severely weakened fabric of the state, opposition leaders kept not quite deciding on 
a boycott – though they also continued to accuse the UPC of malpractice.75  
The motivation to monitor 
Uganda’s politicians were not the only ones focused on stability and the construction of political 
order. There are some methodological perils in exploring international attitudes, for the availability 
of UK diplomatic records may lead to an undue emphasis on the significance of British policy and 
ideas – it was, after all, Tanzanian soldiers who had their boots on the ground. Yet British 
government opinion did matter: while Obote himself shunned any direct contact, other Ugandan 
politicians, pro- and anti-Obote, repeatedly sought the advice and support of British diplomats. The 
US government did not always consult with the UK on Uganda – to occasional British annoyance – 
but shared diplomatic correspondence suggests that there was substantial cooperation between the 
two governments, and between the UK, Canada and Australia.76    
At the time of Amin’s fall, British officials had agreed that British interests were primarily in securing 
debt repayments, compensation for British nationals whose property had been seized, and 
preventing Uganda from being a ‘foothold’ for ‘anti-Western interests’; those aims were repeatedly 
restated in the following months – in discussions which suggest some similarity with debates about 
British interests and electoral politics in Kenya a decade later.77 The ideas of order and stability were 
woven through British ideas of how to secure these aims, and UK diplomats expressed general 
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support for the idea of elections to ‘settle the question of the political leadership’.78 ‘Uganda’s 
problem is essentially one of law and order’, declared the British secretary of state for foreign 
affairs, in a circular telegram intended to ensure a consistent message.79 Bertram Flack, the British 
High Commissioner in Kampala, worried that ‘there is no real legality or constitutional basis for much 
or perhaps anything that has happened since the liberation’.80 An election would provide such 
legality, yet he feared that a ‘free and fair’ election might not be feasible.  
In the wake of Binaisa’s removal, Otema Allimadi – who was both foreign minister in Muwanga’s de 
facto government and (conveniently) the manager of the UPC election campaign – formally 
requested British financial support for the elections. He simultaneously placed an order for election 
materials from the UK security printing firm, De La Rue, who immediately became an interested 
party and began lobbying for UK government financing for the election.81 The total order, which 
went well beyond De La Rue’s usual business, and included everything from Landrovers to lamps, as 
well as ballot papers and ballot boxes, was for more than £2 million – and  the Ugandan government 
let it be known that they could not afford to pay more than a third of this. 
Linked to the question of who would pay for the elections was the issue of observation. Binaisa had 
already raised the possibility that the Commonwealth might observe elections, as part of a wider 
gambit to try and secure a Commonwealth police force, which he had hoped would replace the 
Tanzanian soldiers and, at the same time, protect him from Muwanga.82 The idea of a 
Commonwealth security presence was never seriously considered, but the suggestion of observation 
was taken up by others. Obote and the UPC played an effective game on this – which in many ways 
may be seen as a precursor to the behaviour of the later ‘pseudo-democrats’, as described by Hyde, 
where observers are invited as a way to signal that a country is democratising.83 Nyerere had 
privately suggested Commonwealth observation shortly after the Tanzanian press had advanced the 
idea of multi-party elections. Obote then publicly took up the idea, and in a speech at Bushenyi 
noted: ‘[I] recommend to people responsible for organizing the elections to invite official observers 
from the Commonwealth and OAU countries to observe the fairness of the elections’.84   
The Commonwealth Secretariat also had their own reasons to observe. Shortly after Obote’s 
Bushenyi speech, Allimadi made a visit to London to the Secretariat, which, at the time, was flush 
from its recent perceived triumph over the Zimbabwean elections. For Secretary-General Shridath 
Ramphal, elections offered a means to give a new purpose and energy to the Commonwealth, which 
was – then, as always – facing questions about its real role and purpose in international affairs. 
Around this time, Ramphal gave a speech in the Caribbean in which he declared that: ‘[t]he therapy 
of free elections has no equal. I know of no better prescription for ensuring the health of the body 
politic’.85  From the first approach, Ramphal and his staff were keen to become involved in the 
Ugandan elections, though political and financial realities meant that they could not do so without 
British government support. 
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But while other parties were quick to accept the idea of Commonwealth observation, Obote and the 
UPC persistently punctuated their enthusiasm with expressions of hostility. In July, a UPC meeting 
denounced the idea of observation as a ‘serious imputation on the integrity and impartiality of our 
leaders’.86 Before his mission to the Commonwealth, Allimadi was reportedly critical of the very idea 
of observation, on the grounds that it came close to a ‘derogation from sovereignty’. Yet, shortly 
afterwards, he was back in London at the Commonwealth Secretariat repeating the request for 
observers.87 The Uganda Times questioned the value of a ‘so-called neutral group’, and argued that 
‘[t]here are people who will not be happy about our situation until London, Washington or what 
have you gives a blessing’.88 Coordinated or not, these mixed messages ensured that observers 
would feel constrained, but would nevertheless come, ensuring an election ‘which the world have to 
take seriously’ – as Uganda’s information minister told a meeting in London, in a disingenuous 
affirmation of the importance of the international gaze. 89  
Obote and Allimadi were not the only ones who foresaw problems. Some Commonwealth 
governments were reportedly anxious that Ramphal and the Secretariat were running well ahead of 
local realities in their support for the idea of observation.90 Opinion in the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office was uncertain, and at times sharply divided: should they take the risk of 
funding the elections and observations given that, as one official had noted in June, ‘[t]he odds are 
that elections in Uganda will go wrong; they will be rigged, or mismanaged, or even not held at all’? 
Other Commonwealth governments were reported equally reluctant to be involved. By October, less 
than two months before the (rescheduled) election date of 10 December, no decision had been 
taken over funds or the observer mission. When Ramphal wrote to the British prime minister 
pressing for British involvement, the FCO drafted a holding reply which read: ‘We are not yet in a 
position to decide whether the prospects for adequately free and fair elections in Uganda are good 
enough to take the risk of association with elections which could go wrong.’91 
That the British government finally decided to support both elections and monitoring was the result 
of a combination of pragmatic Cold War calculation and a half-cynical, half-naïve fetishization of the 
ballot. From Kampala, British diplomats had consistently reported both their mistrust of Obote who 
they believed was ‘widely hated and disliked in Uganda’, and their expectation that he would 
nonetheless become president in one way or another – if he did not win the election, he would be 
installed in office by a military coup.92 They reported also their view that a coup would seriously 
undermine any hope of stability, and that elections offered ‘the only immediate hope, though again 
no guarantee, of reasonable or improving economic stability or recovery’. UK and other western aid 
had been largely suspended after Binaisa was toppled; it would be hard to restore this without an 
election, and, in the absence of funding, the structures of the state would be hard to maintain.93 The 
consequence of that might be the spread of Soviet influence – even, the British high commissioner 
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suggested, the deployment of Cuban or East German soldiers to Uganda.94  In early November, Flack 
finally succeeded in meeting with Obote, who had reassured him that ‘Uganda would greatly rely on 
Britain’; Flack recommended that ‘we should resume relations with him on a clean slate’.95  
In London, some officials had already argued that ‘the holding of elections is strongly in Uganda’s 
interest, and by extention [sic] our own . . . The establishment of a democratically-elected 
government would make a great contribution towards a return to internal stability and normality’; 
and by September one was opining firmly that ‘[b]y far the best thing would be for elections to take 
place in Uganda and a settled regime established’.96 A memo prepared for the UK cabinet reiterated 
the point: ‘elections will not in themselves solve Uganda’s problems but have seemed an essential 
prerequisite for a return to political stability.’ There was a potentially awkward corollary to this 
argument, of course: ‘[a]n unfavourable report by UK observers . . . on an election which brought 
Obote to power would gain us nothing’.97 Yet if there were no observers, then there was an evident 
danger that there might be so much malpractice that it would anyway be impossible to recognize 
their outcome. In Uganda, meanwhile, British and other diplomats talked to the other parties about 
their complaints, and sought to persuade them to contest the election in spite of these – on the 
basis that they really had no alternative.98 
Finally, in early November, Richard Luce, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, visited Kampala. He 
had recently expressed his reluctance to help finance the elections, but after the visit he explained 
that he had changed his view, because of 
the universal longing in Uganda for elections as a first step towards national recovery and 
the restoration of legitimacy. . . . For the first time a Commonwealth country has sought 
Commonwealth support for holding elections. If these do not take place there will be a 
growing power vacuum of the kind which the Soviet Union and its surrogates are expert in 
exploiting.  
Luce pointed out that Obote has ‘emphised [sic] privately that his economic interests lie with closer 
links with Britain and Kenya. Nevertheless, the Cubans are waiting in the wings.’99 The US 
government had come to a similar conclusion; they offered financial support for the elections and 
discreetly encouraged India to send election monitors, while at the same time the US ambassador 
saw Muwanga privately to ask him to rein in the UNLA.100  
The 1980 elections: Of malpractice and the monitors 
The British decision to support the elections triggered the release of other funds, already promised 
by Australia and Canada. The British were also rapidly drawn in to the elections even more deeply, 
for now they could not allow the process to fail. As well as the direct grant offered to pay for the 
elections – which, of course, went almost entirely (and straight) to De La Rue – they were asked to 
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arrange transport for the materials – since it would be embarrassing if the elections were delayed 
because a UK firm had failed to deliver materials on time. The US Air Force provided two transport 
flights; but these were not enough, and the UK government resorted to chartering two British 
Airways 747s, at an additional cost of £90,000, to move the equipment.101 Then a shortage of 
transport became apparent, and the government was asked to expedite the delivery of Landrovers, 
which were being provided as aid to the Uganda Police, so that these could be used for election 
observation work. Not all could be made available in time, so twenty additional Landrovers were 
bought from the assembly plant in Kenya and rushed to Uganda. Then there were the costs of the 
observation mission itself, to which the UK contributed £125,000.102 
Meanwhile, in Uganda, controversy raged over the electoral arrangements, amid an increasingly 
febrile and violent atmosphere. Just over a month before the election, 14 of Uganda’s 33 district 
commissioners – the men responsible for electoral management – were dismissed and replaced by 
men appointed directly by the Military Commission. Soon afterwards, Obote publicly warned civil 
servants to ‘stop frustrating the UPC election efforts’.103 One man who was a young UPM activist at 
the time recalled that in his constituency, the district commissioner set about ensuring that all 
polling staff were UPC supporters.104 
The existing electoral law – passed under British rule in 1957 – stipulated both the use of multiple 
ballot boxes (with voters entering a screened room to cast an unmarked ballot into one of four 
boxes, one for each party) and the counting of ballots at a central place in each constituency on the 
day following the voting. The opposition parties were bitterly opposed to both, arguing that they 
made cheating extremely easy: votes, or box labels, would simply be switched while the boxes were 
in transit. As Bwengye argued at the time, ‘multi-boxes will facilitate malpractice as was the case in 
the past when the UPC used to emerge victorious even though it had no support in the country’.105 
The UPC, and Muwanga, remained obdurate on the question of multiple ballot boxes – so too did 
the Electoral Commission, which had been hand-picked by Muwanga.106 The question of where the 
votes should be counted was more open for discussion; Nyerere, fearing that the DP and UPM really 
might boycott the election, and so rob it of its legitimacy, summoned all party leaders to Dar es 
Salaam, where they agreed that ballots should be counted at the polling station immediately at the 
end of voting. The Electoral Commission then, five days before the election, announced its 
opposition to this agreement – probably under pressure from Muwanga.107  
The Commonwealth Observer Group, which had finally arrived in the country, with a specific 
mandate to judge whether the elections were ‘free and fair’, threatened to leave again, on the 
grounds that this violated the agreement with the parties, and would discredit the process 
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entirely.108 Obote – personally, and through the government newspaper – launched an impassioned 
attack on them for interference; the information minister, back from London, told the Observer 
Group publicly that ‘I hope you are here to observe but not to pass judgment on Uganda. Ugandans 
alone have the right to choose their government’.109 But Muwanga conceded, just three days before 
the polls were due, and agreed that the count would be done at each polling station. 
Meanwhile, just as the observers arrived at the end of November, the nomination of candidates took 
place, which saw multiple and egregious malpractices. UPC candidates were successfully nominated 
in 125 of the 126 constituencies. In 14 of these they were unopposed, because DP (and some UPM) 
candidates were not nominated. In a number of constituencies in West Nile, this was because there 
had been no voter registration, after an attack by armed men (who were said to be supporters of 
Amin) had overrun the whole area at the time of registration, and driven tens of thousands from 
their homes. Since candidates seeking nomination had to be proposed by registered voters, this 
made nomination technically impossible; nonetheless, the returning officer accepted the nomination 
of UPC candidates.  
Elsewhere, prospective DP candidates were detained at roadblocks until the nomination deadline 
had passed, or found that although they had delivered their nomination papers on time, the 
returning officers declared that they had come too late. These candidates were perhaps fortunate; 
in one constituency, the DP’s aspiring nominee was found dead shortly before nomination day. 
Three days before the ballot, the Electoral Commission announced that it had cancelled the 
nomination of three more DP candidates, in Kasese in the west of the country, on technical grounds; 
at the same time it reinstated the candidacy of the only UPC candidate whose nomination had been 
refused. Thus, UPC went into the election having already won 17 of the 126 seats; given the pattern 
of ethnic and regional voting, it seems likely that they would have won some of these anyway, but 
others would probably have gone to the DP. Ebenezer Debrah, the Ghanaian leader of the Observer 
Group, agreed to send a strong protest over the nominations, but other members of the group 
suspected that he was all-too ready to believe Muwanga’s argument that the DP had simply been 
disorganized; certainly, his letter on the subject was mildly phrased.110 Indeed, mild phrasing became 
something of a speciality; when the assistant to the secretary of the Electoral Commission was 
murdered by men in military uniform just before the election – a killing widely seen to be an act of 
intimidation – the Observer Group wrote to the secretary to condole on the ‘tragic and untimely 
passing’ of his assistant.111 
Just before the election began, a UK Foreign Office memo summed up the likely outcome: ‘a UPC 
(Obote) victory secured with a measure of intimidation and dirty tricks but not to an extent that 
would lead the Commonwealth observers to submit more than a qualified report . . . [which] would 
at any rate be an improvement on the present situation and would raise no major problems in 
conducting our relations with Uganda’.112 Hillier-Fry, who had just replaced Flack as high 
commissioner in Kampala, reported that if Obote lost the election, there would be a military coup, 
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which would place him in power anyway.113 The nine observers of the Commonwealth Observer 
Group, their numbers boosted to around 60 by the involvement of various assistants, spread 
themselves out around the country in the few days before the elections. Constantly hampered by 
logistical problems – over fuel, accommodation, and even food – they had no time to meet with 
local party activists outside Kampala, and found themselves heavily dependent on the local 
administrative staff.114 Nonetheless, they were continually denounced by UPC supporters: the 
Uganda Times opined that it was ‘worrying that foreigners have been allowed a free hand to acquire 
an executive role in the conduct of the polls of a sovereign state’.115 
In the final days before the election, the Uganda Times again reminded people of the importance of 
the election, in the process evoking international opinion to demand electoral participation and 
echoing the language of late-colonial elections: 
As we approach the elections we would like to appeal to all Ugandans to shed their minor 
contradictions and realise that the nation’s destiny is at stake. Electioneering is the only way 
we can ensure that a responsible government runs the affairs of the country to our 
satisfaction . . . It is the duty of us all to ensure that we build a system that will make the 
country repair its pride among other nations.116  
The next day, the paper editorialized further on the disciplinary nature of elections:  
This process is very important to the election of a popularly elected government. And 
because of its importance it must be held in maximum secrecy and generally secure 
conditions. No one must be allowed to harass members of the public as they go to vote . .  . 
All the people will be required to do is to line up peacefully and wait for their turns to be 
attended to by polling assistants and presiding officers.117   
When polling began on 10 December, it was intended to be completed in a single day, but it soon 
became clear – to poll officials, as well as to observers – that this would be inadequate in some 
places. Curiously, it was in the capital, Kampala, which was expected to poll heavily for DP, that 
there were the most serious delays in opening the poll, for reasons that were never explained.118 
Polling was therefore extended into the 11 December; on the night of 10/11, party agents in many 
places insisted on spending the night in the same room as the boxes to prevent malpractice. The 
observers subsequently claimed to have visited 1,476 polling stations during the voting; a record 
that is both remarkable and suggestive of the brevity of most of those visits. They came away ‘very 
impressed by the large and orderly turn-out to vote’; Bwengye, and others, have argued that beyond 
the view of observers, there were high levels of compulsion, and he produced a photograph of 
cowed voters queuing under the barrels of soldiers’ guns as evidence.119  
The turnout was extraordinary – well over 80% of the registered voters in most places, which meant 
that rather more than one quarter of the total population voted. This is a remarkable number in a 
country where slightly more than half the population were under 18. Such figures might seem to 
suggest wholesale ballot-stuffing, and it seems likely that there was some local malpractice involving 
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multiple voting and/or stuffing – so that one constituency, for example, recorded a 103% turnout. 
But if such manipulation occurred, it appears to have balanced out: turnout levels were generally 
consistent across UPC and DP strongholds. Fragmentary archival records suggest local electoral staff 
– civil servants and school students hired for the task – went diligently through the rituals of the 
secret ballot, with stamped and signed forms recording votes from individual polling stations, and 
even lists of ‘tendered ballots’.120 In Buganda, where the UPC suffered more or less complete 
electoral annihilation, the turnout was as high as it was in the UPC heartlands in the north (the 103% 
came here). Tito Okello, the commander of the UNLA, ‘praised Ugandans for their peaceful attitude 
and love for political progress’ and called the election ‘a day of rebirth when Uganda will once more 
have its rightful place in Africa and the world community’.121 
This positive impression was almost immediately dispelled as results came in. The DP claimed that it 
had taken an early lead in the polls. However, on 11 December, Muwanga issued a proclamation 
forbidding the Electoral Commission from announcing results and directing that all results should be 
submitted to him personally. In addition, he gave himself the power to decide whether the results 
had been ‘free and fair’ or should be overturned.122 There was uproar; the Observer Group 
threatened again to leave immediately, and a few hours later Muwanga withdrew the order.123 The 
Electoral Commission had, however, fallen silent; its secretary had gone into hiding (and fled the 
country two nights later) and the rest of its members temporarily vanished from the office.  
When the Commission resumed the announcement of results, these showed a very substantial UPC 
victory. In the end, UPC secured 74 seats, against 51 for DP and 1 for UPM; though in terms of the 
overall vote, the DP secured more votes overall. Thus, in addition into electoral manipulation and 
greater resources, the victory of the UPC owed much to the first-past-the-post electoral system, 
which left them underrepresented in the legislature relative to their national share of the ballot. The 
process of tallying at a constituency level had been largely unobserved, since the Observer Group 
had returned to Kampala on 11 December and – following an outbreak of shooting around their 
hotel that evening – were largely withdrawn on 12 December.124 They had, however, already issued 
the interim statement quoted at the beginning of this paper, which allowed the Military Commission 
to announce that ‘the British government was satisfied that the elections were conducted in a free 
and fair manner’.125  
In the next few days, Obote was sworn in; the British High Commissioner noted (with a curious 
mixture of chagrin and pleasure) that he arrived for the ceremony in a UK-registered Mercedes, 
escorted by a police Landrover marked ‘British Aid’.126 The Uganda Times announced with glee that 
‘[t]he Commonwealth has declared the election to be a valid expression of the people’s choice’; 
Muwanga’s speech at the swearing-in called on the DP ‘[i]n the name of democracy and for respect 
for our country . . . to respect the wishes of the people of Uganda’.127 The international press, 
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meanwhile, was full of stories of malpractice; the Washington Post judged that the Military 
Commission ‘stole the election . . . before the eyes of a British Commonwealth Observer Group’.128 
From Kampala, the British High Commissioner noted ‘disquieting evidence, or at least information, of 
massive and gross rigging’, while the British ambassador to the US reported the ‘disgust’ in 
Washington at the conduct of the elections.129 But Ramphal reportedly ‘reacted very strongly’ to 
suggestions of widespread malpractice, seeing this as a slur on the observers.130 In Uganda, the 
Uganda Times denounced foreign journalists who questioned the election results: ‘we shall not 
tolerate foreign journalists who come here to fan trouble’.131 The DP, having denounced the results, 
nevertheless decided to take up its seats in parliament. As one DP candidate – who attributed his 
defeat entirely to rigging at the tallying stage – later explained: there was no alternative for those 
who believed in ‘civilised government’.132 The new DP members of parliament soon found 
themselves subject to an often brutal campaign of personal intimidation.133 Within the UK Foreign 
Office, the tone of internal communication turned quickly to a matter-of-fact assertion that bad 
elections were better than no elections: ‘It is preferable that Obote should have regained power by 
elections, however flawed, than through a coup d’etat’.134  
Conclusion 
The ideal of elections weaves together two projects. It is a powerful ‘state effect’ – to borrow 
Timothy Mitchell’s term – which asserts a lawful order.135 It also asserts the principle that 
governments should be chosen by popular will. Ideally combined, these projects are in tension, and 
the realities of politics may even leave them opposed. Such was the case in Uganda in 1980: the 
elections did not return a government chosen by the people.  
Hyde’s work has explained the spread of international election monitoring in terms of the ‘pseudo-
democrat’s dilemma’: incumbent leaders who intend malpractice to secure election victory must 
nonetheless invite observers, and run the risk of detection, because if they do not the legitimating 
value of the elections will be lost.136 Yet the Uganda elections remind us that there is a companion 
dilemma to this: the observers’ dilemma. Should an imperfect election be denounced for failing to 
express the popular will, when it might yet play a role in state-building, and stave off the imminent 
collapse of order? The observers in Uganda decided that it should: though, in the end, their decision 
led to precisely the kind of violence that they had feared: in 1985, Obote was deposed in a coup and 
one year later the government fell to an armed rebellion led by Museveni, who was subsequently 
appointed president. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Commonwealth report as evidence that the elections had been fair: Kenneth Ingham, Obote: a Political 
Biography (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 169-75. 
128
 Editorial, ‘Do you know Uganda?’, Washington Post, 15 Dec. 1980, 20. 
129
 Henderson, British Embassy, Washington to FCO 15 Dec. 1980 and Hillier-Fry, BHC Kampala to FCO, UKNA 
FCO 31/2915. 
130
 Robson to Allinson, 17 Dec. 1980, UKNA FCO 31/2916. 
131
 Editorial, ‘We do not want these journalists’, Uganda Times, 16 Dec. 1980, 4; Robson, FCO to Allinson, FCO, 
17 Dec. 1980, UKNA FCO 31/2916. 
132
 Interview, Damian Mutahiigwa, 12 June 2015. 
133
 Interview, Kitaka-Gaweera, 24 March 2015. 
134
 Robson, FCO to Allinson, FCO, 16 Dec. 1980, UKNA FCO 31/2916. 
135
 Timothy Mitchell. ‘The limits of the state: beyond statist approaches and their critics’, American Political 
Science Review, 85, 1 (1991): 77-96. 
136
 Susan D. Hyde, The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011) 
20 
 
The observers’ final report justified their decision partly by approaching the elections as a technical 
exercise. It dealt with each of the ‘major aspects of the electoral process’ in order; identifying 
problems, but implicitly asserting the value of these multiple techniques.137 And the conclusion of 
the report offered the extent of popular enthusiasm and involvement as an implicit endorsement of 
the process: people ‘turned out in very great numbers at dawn and waited with admirable patience’ 
and ‘[s]urmounting all obstacles, the people of Uganda, like some great tidal wave, carried the 
electoral process to a worthy and valid conclusion’.138  The message was clear: elections that had 
inspired such a level of participation, and had performed order so well, could not be simply 
annulled.139 
However, the failure of the elections to secure peace and stability suggests the destabilizing impact 
of flawed elections in divided societies. In the case of Uganda, the decision to allow Obote’s victory 
may have staved off the prospect of an imminent coup to install him in office, but it simultaneously 
sowed the seeds of a longer and bloodier conflict in the years to come. It also undermined the 
confidence of many within the Ugandan elite in the electoral process, which is one reason that the 
Museveni government has insisted on retaining such tight control of the process ever since.140 The 
case of Uganda should therefore serve as an important reminder that the strategy that best 
promotes short-term stability is not necessarily conducive to long-term state-building: elections can 
be ‘state-breaking’, rather than state-building.141 In this sense, the observers’ dilemma is even more 
difficult to resolve than it first appears. 
International election monitoring has developed – and in many ways improved – very substantially 
since 1980. Observation groups are generally larger, better resourced, and pursue a long-term 
approach that highlights – and, of course, has learned from – the weaknesses of the Uganda mission. 
But many of their reports have followed the same logic: offering ordered discussion of the 
institutions and processes of the election, and insisting that a willing populace were ready to play 
the role of voting citizenry if only the agencies of the state were willing and able to permit this. A 
problematic election, such as that in Kenya in 1992, led to a report which spelled out multiple 
failings in detail – the partiality of the electoral management body, ‘recurring episodes of violence, 
harassment and intimidation’, and ‘constraints on the exercise of freedom of speech and assembly’. 
But it simultaneously offered a generally high turnout as evidence of the ‘eager cooperation’ of the 
people ‘in this critical phase of their political development’, and concluded that ‘the results in many 
instances reflected, however imperfectly, the expression of the will of the people’.142  
Even some of the most critical reports – as in Uganda in 2011, where the Commonwealth Observer 
Group declared that the elections ‘did not fully meet national, regional and international standards 
for democratic elections’ – have continued to combine the detailed enumeration of failures in 
process with an evocation of the possibilities for good citizenship revealed by ‘generally peaceful’ 
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polls conducted in a ‘calm and orderly’ manner.143 While some have argued that Commonwealth 
missions are particularly reluctant to criticise problematic elections, this style is not restricted to 
Commonwealth observation reports. The European Union report on the 2011 Ugandan elections 
similarly noted ‘multiple irregularities which showed every indication of being deliberate’ but noted 
that the ‘peaceful manner’ in which the elections were conducted showed that ‘further progress 
towards a fully pluralistic and multi-party democracy can be achieved’.144 Thus, despite the many 
changes that have taken place, monitors’ reports continue to follow the template laid down in 
Uganda in 1980; while listing far-reaching failings, they typically stop short of declaring that the 
elections were “unfree and unfair”. In avoiding this potent phrase, which has both symbolic and 
legal resonance, they tacitly endorse deeply flawed political processes.  
As a result, monitoring continues to attract criticism, either for being irrelevant and ineffective or – 
even more damningly – for excusing authoritarianism, or even for encouraging assaults on judicial 
independence or the integrity of the administration.145 Such criticisms, justified as they may be, 
discount the profound dilemma that confronted the observers in Uganda, and which has faced many 
others since, as they ‘balance law and everyday politics in the construction of power and 
sovereignty’.146 Elections were not simply driven by the external agenda of international actors, nor 
were they just an act of political theatre concocted by African and Western leaders. The power of 
elections – in Uganda in 1980, and subsequently elsewhere – has been precisely that they draw in a 
range of actors into techniques which perform order and state authority. To condemn elections, 
even when they are evidently unfair in multiple ways, endangers this sometimes fragile order. For 
the observer no amount of time, nor resource, nor size of mission, can fully resolve that dilemma.  
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